New law, insolvency regulation and the rescue culture

The UK insolvency regime began preparing for the 21st century with the Cork Report in 1982. That led directly to the Insolvency Act 1986, introducing the rescue mechanisms of administration and voluntary arrangements. Major refinements followed with the Enterprise Act 2002, enhancing the new mechanisms and facilitating the constructive use of insolvency procedures.

Since then, however, it has not been entirely plain sailing:

  • administration is widely seen as terminal: "going bust" is a common media description although the procedure is designed as a temporary opportunity for restoration;
  • the effectiveness of administration has been seriously blunted by various rent, pension and other claims being elevated to the status of administration expenses, payable before creditors;
  • similarly, TUPE (the implementation of the European Acquired Rights Directive) and its application by employment courts has stymied business rescue and failed to preserve employment;
  • pre-pack administrations have been occasionally abused and widely misunderstood; and
  • an erroneous perception of insolvency practitioners charging huge fees whilst failing to act in creditors' best interests has been allowed to emerge.

Many of these challenges can be attributed, at least in part, to the insolvency profession not explaining itself sufficiently well, either generally or in individual cases and either to creditors and other stakeholders or to the media and politicians.

The influencing of legislative change has certainly improved, led by the trade body, R3, whose recent success in persuading the government to abandon its ill-advised proposal to require 3 days' notice of business and asset sales to related parties is noteworthy.

However, more needs to be done to remedy defects in the law. Take for example the undue emphasis on rescuing the company (usually a valueless capital structure that is no longer fit for purpose) rather than the business, the craftable value creation unit at the heart of the enterprise, which can often be restored to health, perhaps under different ownership. More specifically, incursions into the administration expense regime need to be halted to restore the value of administration as a rescue tool. Goods and services actually used during an administration are proper expenses that should be paid, but contracts should be terminable by administrators (with damages constituting an unsecured claim). Post-insolvency Financial Support Directions from the Pensions Regulator should also, statutorily, constitute an unsecured claim. TUPE should be revised at least to exclude liquidation and liquidation-type administration sales.

Another area where legislative change is necessary is insolvency practitioner regulation. We need a single regulator that is and is seen to be independent and effective. Nothing less will do, despite the self-interested argument of some of the existing self-regulatory bodies.

The final area for improvement is a cultural issue for many practitioners. The art of communicating - through whatever might be the best medium - to all the relevant stakeholders in the distressed environment of a formal insolvency, where many have lost money, is often neglected by practitioners. They do so at their peril. This is especially so because a few communication failures damage the whole profession. The debacle of poorly explained IPs' fees and the contortions of the legislation and professional guidance on disclosure that were imposed because of public dissatisfaction is a case in point. IPs of course also need to communicate publicly - and in this age of instant 24/7 media coverage that is a skill to be learnt and honed.

Has the rescue culture lost its way? We certainly need more appropriate legislation, but the impetus for the right changes must come from the insolvency profession.

 

Unfair Lehman and Nortel pensions decision wrecks the rescue culture

The administrators of 20 Lehman and Nortel companies face meeting Financial Support Directions (FSDs) and Contribution Notices (CNs) from The Pensions Regulator as an expense of the administrations because of the judgment handed down by Mr Justice Briggs.

The implications for the rescue culture are severe - unless the hope expressed by Briggs J

"that a higher court may find a way through or around the existing authorities"

is rewarded as the case is appealed.

The scope of the decision should not be underestimated. Any administration of a company that has been, at any time within the previous two years, an associate or connected to an employer with a defined benefit pension scheme shortfall, has a contingent expense, payable in priority to all other creditors (and the administrators' fees) that could amount to the whole shortfall.

Briggs J clearly reached his decision with considerable misgivings, recognising its unfairness and injustice. He observed, in relation to what he described as "a legislative mess" that

"the Insolvency Service or Parliament might wish to consider a suitable amendment, either to the Rules or to the 2004 Act, if persuaded as I have been that the conferring of super-priority as expenses upon the financial liabilities arising from the FSD regime is both potentially unfair to the target's creditors and inconsistent with a decision taken in 2004 not generally to elevate employees' pension claims above the claims of those creditors."

Such a judgment hardly clarifies the effect of an FSD on an insolvent "target". In reality, the interests of pension scheme members and the Pension Protection Fund have collided with the rescue culture like a wrecking ball.

The judgment merits reading for its detailed consideration of the interaction of insolvency and pensions law, for its analysis of administration expenses and the Toshoku principle, and for the finding that parliament legislated (probably inadvertently) for the pensions/insolvency interaction to be addressed by a mechanism that is not fit for purpose.

Insolvency can be good for you!

A version of this article first appeared in Financier Worldwide Global Restructuring & Insolvency Review 2003

The 21st century has seen the firm establishment of a rescue culture in the UK, exemplified by the growing influence of the Society of Turnaround Professionals and the now familiar corporate insolvency provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002.

The legislative developments have served to lower entry barriers to insolvency proceedings in terms of cost and perception, the latter through reducing the "stigma of bankruptcy". In particular, the statutory objectives of administration, which is firmly established as the jurisdictionís principal non-terminal corporate insolvency procedure, are defined with "rescuing the company as a going concern" as the first priority.

Solutions like those in the case studies below are now easier to implement (if not necessarily to conceive or manage), making it all the more vital to consult an experienced and rescue-oriented insolvency practitioner at an early stage.

In Case Study 1, early realisation that the groupís cost reductions had lagged the industry-wide market collapse was a key factor, enabling the (nevertheless rapid) formulation and execution of a refinancing and balance sheet restructuring plan. Had this company not been caught in time it would have hit the buffers really hard ñ speed of reaction was of the essence.

Case Study 1

Antal International Limited ñ £20m turnover global recruitment business

Problem:


  • Dramatic market contraction 2001


Solution:

  • Bank debt replaced by invoice financing.

  • Invoice financiers would only fund with administrators controlling company.

  • Administration (August 2002) allowed more cost cutting and "breathing space".

  • Subsequent Company Voluntary Arrangement (October 2002) eliminated excess creditors and restored profitability and cash generation.


Other Features:

  • Paramount distinguished (administrator did not automatically adopt employment contracts after 14 days).

  • European Insolvency Regulations tested in action.


Case Study 2 was a relatively healthy core business being turned around successfully. However, the reverse premium that would have been required to effect a trade sale of the two most seriously underperforming subsidiaries would have brought it down. Selling the subsidiary businesses and assets as going concerns through a formal insolvency process was anathema to the incumbent management, but we showed them the value of an insolvency tool in the right hands. Here it both avoided a potentially terminal cash drain and protected the core business from the likely counter-claims of group-wide customers if the subsidiariesí businesses had not continued.

Case Study 2

£10m turnover engineering business
Problem:


  • Restructured 2000

  • Ongoing turnaround

  • 2 subsidiaries draining cash.


Solution:

  • Subsidiariesí administrative receivership (October 2002).

  • Going concern sales of their businesses and assets.

  • Remaining group freed of cost, risk and contingent liabilities.


Other Features:

  • Group pension fund issues required preparation for parent company administration to precipitate commercial settlement on the steps of the Court.


Case Study 3 is the most innovative. The cash-rich quoted shell with a positive balance sheet had contingent liabilities that the Court was persuaded (unlike in Colt Telecom) were more likely than not to render the company unable to pay its debts as they fell due. However, the very use of a formal insolvency procedure prompted the crystallisation of many of those contingencies, yielding significant benefits to shareholders. The administration exit was the return of control to its directors, when the company's shares were relisted at 6 times the price at which they had been suspended.

Case Study 3

PNC Telecom plc ñ £60m turnover AIM-listed former mobile retail and fixed line telephone company.
Problem:


  • Contingencies remaining after sale of operating businesses/subsidiaries precluded use of the shell as a vehicle for a reverse takeover or distribution to shareholders via a membersí voluntary liquidation.


Solution:

  • Administration order (June 2003) prompted landlords to accept replacement obligations from the business purchaser and enabled litigation contingencies to be reduced.


Other Features:

  • s236 Insolvency Act applications allowed the administrator to obtain information about the companyís affairs more quickly and cheaply than could the turnaround managers.


In each of these cases a turnaround manager not well-versed in the benefits of formal insolvency procedures might have continued to "think positive", avoiding insolvency at the risk of missing the opportunity of a successful rescue. I believe that a balanced mix of turnaround and insolvency skills and an ability to innovate are most likely to deliver optimal solutions to the stakeholders of companies in financial distress.

Insolvency can be good for you!

The 21st century has seen the firm establishment of a rescue culture in the UK, exemplified by the successful establishment of the Society of Turnaround Professionals and the coming into force of the corporate insolvency provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 in September 2003.

The legislative changes have served to lower entry barriers to insolvency proceedings in terms of cost and perception, the latter through reducing the "stigma of bankruptcy". In particular, the statutory objectives of administration, which has been re-established as the jurisdictionís principal non-terminal insolvency procedure, are now defined with "rescuing the company as a going concern" as the first priority. Solutions like those in the case studies below will now be easier to implement (if not necessarily to conceive or manage), making it all the more vital to consult an experienced and rescue-oriented insolvency practitioner at an early stage. Each case study is factual and I was the administrator and/or the company's advisor.

In Case Study 1, early realisation that the groupís cost reductions had lagged the industry-wide market collapse was a key factor, enabling the (nevertheless rapid) formulation and execution of a refinancing and balance sheet restructuring plan. Had this company not been caught in time it would have hit the buffers really hard ñ speed of reaction was of the essence.

Case Study 2 was a relatively healthy core business being turned around successfully. However, the reverse premium that would have been required to effect a trade sale of the two most seriously underperforming subsidiaries would have brought it down. Selling the subsidiary businesses and assets as going concerns through a formal insolvency process was anathema to the incumbent management, but we showed them the value of an insolvency tool in the right hands. Here it both avoided a potentially terminal cash drain and protected the core business from the likely counter-claims of group-wide customers if the subsidiariesí businesses had not continued.

Case Study 3 is the most innovative. The cash-rich quoted shell with a positive balance sheet had contingent liabilities that the Court was persuaded (unlike in Colt Telecom) were more likely than not to render the company unable to pay its debts as they fell due. However, the very use of a formal insolvency procedure prompted the crystallisation of many of those contingencies such that there was a value to shareholders - the shares were relisted on return of the company to the directors at six time the price at which they were suspended on administration.

In each of these cases a turnaround manager not well-versed in the benefits of formal insolvency procedures might have continued to "think positive", avoiding insolvency at the risk of missing the opportunity of a successful rescue. I believe that a balanced mix of turnaround and insolvency skills and an ability to innovate are most likely to deliver optimal solutions to the stakeholders of companies in financial distress.


  • Case Study 1


Antal International Limited ñ £20m turnover global recruitment business
Problem: Dramatic market contraction
Solution: Bank debt replaced by invoice financing. Invoice financiers would only fund with administrators controlling company. Administration allowed more cost cutting and "breathing space". Subsequent Company Voluntary Arrangement eliminated excess creditors and restored profitability and cash generation.
Other Features: Paramount distinguished (administrator did not automatically adopt employment contracts after 14 days). European Insolvency Regulations tested in action.


  • Case Study 2


£10m turnover engineering business
Problem: Restructured, ongoing turnaround, 2 subsidiaries draining cash.
Solution: Subsidiariesí administrative receivership. Going concern sales of their businesses and assets. Remaining group freed of cost, risk and contingent liabilities.
Other Features: Group pension fund issues required preparation for parent company administration to precipitate commercial settlement on the steps of the Court.


  • Case Study 3


PNC Telecom plc ñ £60m turnover AIM-listed former mobile retail and fixed line telephone company.
Problem: Contingencies remaining after sale of operating businesses/subsidiaries precluded use of the shell as a vehicle for a reverse takeover or distribution to shareholders via a membersí voluntary liquidation.
Solution: Administration order prompted landlords to accept replacement obligations from the business purchaser and enabled litigation contingencies to be reduced. Administration ended after 7 months and company relisted at 6 times the price at which the shares were suspended on the date of administration.
Other Features: s236 Insolvency Act applications allowed the administrator to obtain information about the companyís affairs more quickly and cheaply than could the turnaround managers.