Corporate insolvencies fall - a temporary blip?

The headlines from the statistics released last week by the Insolvency Service focus on the record increase in personal insolvencies. There has been an increase of 24.9% on the same quarter last year and 2009 as a whole is 25.9% up on the previous year.

As far as corporate insolvencies are concerned there are marked differences across the different types of insolvency procedure. For liquidations there has been a 23% increase in cases on 2008 whilst the numbers for administrations, after eliminating anomolies, shows just a 1.7% increase for the year. By comparison to the changes on the same quarter last year liquidations have a 1% fall but administrations a drop of some 34%. A closer examination of the numbers show that across all forms of corporate insolvencies the numbers increased throughout 2009 with liquidations and administrations peaking in the second quarter of 2009. The notable exception was company voluntary arrangements, which are continuing to rise. The reduction in liquidations and administrations is likely to be as a result of the reticence of the banks and HMRC to initiate formal insolvency proceedings during this period with the latter promoting their Business Payment Support Service (so called 'time to pay' arrangements) . There is also a greater willingness to support CVAs to maximise the chance of recovery from creditors.

The key question is what is going to happen in the coming months? History dictates that now that we are technically out of recession we can expect the number of insolvencies to climb in the months ahead. Following the recession of the late eighties and early nineties, the level of liquidations did not peak until 1992. This time around the recession has hit harder and whilst I think there can be little doubt that corporate insolvencies will begin to climb again in the near future and will take a long time to fall back to pre-recession levels, the timescale and the level to which they will rise is more difficult to determine.

Peter Godfrey-Evans is a Restructuring & Insolvency partner at Mercer & Hole. The views given in this blog are personal to the author, if you would like to discuss the contents of this post with Peter you can call him on 01908 605552. 

What you should know about insolvency - Part 1

As the UK economy begins, in late 2009, to recover from the harshest recession in 75 years, insolvency is becoming somewhat more prevalent than has been the long term experience of most of us. The few high profile administrations such as Lehman and Woolworths are likely to be followed by many ordinary smaller businesses encountering formal insolvency procedures. Formal insolvencies tend to lag on economic recovery because of reluctance to invoke them and the time it can sometimes take to do so.

Now is therefore an ideal time to remind you about corporate insolvency and this is the first of a series of posts to do so.

Definitions

The word insolvency can be used either in a general sense to identify a company’s illiquidity or over-indebtedness (technical insolvency), or more specifically to identify a company subject to a formal insolvency procedure (formal insolvency).

Technical insolvency is most simply identified using the terms of s123 Insolvency Act 1986 ("IA86"):

  • ‘the company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due’ (illiquid – the cashflow test); or
  • ‘the value of the company’s assets is less than the amount of its liabilities, taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities’ (over-indebted – the balance sheet test).

Classic evidence of the cashflow test being failed includes creditors having issued writs or statutory demands and late payment of PAYE and VAT.

Realisation that the balance sheet test includes contingent and prospective liabilities often puzzles directors because so many companies do fail that test, but it is the case that prospective and contingent liabilities are taken into account when assessing a company’s technical insolvency.

Of course, failure of one of the two tests does not immediately lead to adverse practical consequences or penalties. This is in contrast to some jurisdictions, such as Germany, where it is a criminal offence for directors not to instigate formal insolvency proceedings within three weeks of failing similar illiquidity and over- indebtedness tests. In the UK it is more helpful to consider the concept of the ‘zone of insolvency’.

A distressed company may move into insolvency but with a ‘reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation’.

This paraphrase of part of s214 IA86 (the section that deals with wrongful trading) allows for the taking of a somewhat longer view than under the German system. It is not, however, a view without risk. Even if there had been a long period during which there was a reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation, followed by a calamity that caused liquidation, the company will have been technically insolvent from the moment it failed either the cashflow test or the balance sheet test.

One consequence of technical insolvency is that it determines whether transactions entered into by the company are at risk of being overturned under insolvency legislation relating to antecedent transactions such as transactions at an undervalue (s238 IA86) and preferences (s239). In order for an administrator or a liquidator to be able realistically to take court action to overturn a transaction at an undervalue or a preference, the company must have been in the zone of insolvency at the time of the transaction.

However, the section that more clearly focuses directors’ minds on the zone of insolvency is s214. Wrongful trading – incurring losses when a director ‘knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation’ can lead to the court declaring that the director is personally liable for the amount the court orders to be paid. That amount is likely to reflect the losses suffered by creditors during the period of wrongful trading.

The practicalities of technical insolvency are that:

  •  it can lead to formal insolvency;
  • it introduces additional risks, notably for the directors personally, at a time when the company is already stressed; and
  • the onset of technical insolvency is an ideal time – perhaps even the best time – for a company to take specialist insolvency advice.

Case Study

In July 2007 I was consulted by an AIM listed company whose directors where concerned about its financial position. Since then I have advised the board many times about the risks they face and whether they have a reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation. At times there has been a gap of several months between consultations and at times we have spoken every few days. The company remains in the zone of insolvency but it currently has a reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation and it is less illiquid and less over-indebted than when I was first consulted. It has achieved this through enhancing its profitability and attracting investment. As a start-up company in a relatively new sector it has already become a market leader although it has yet to break even. If it were to stumble and fall into formal insolvency, it seems to me unlikely that the directors would be at significant risk of a wrongful trading action. Also, for the last two years they have been aware that any transactions at an undervalue or preferences could be overturned in the event of formal insolvency – but I am not aware of there having been any such transactions!

Look out for Part 2, which will explain how best to avoid formal insolvency despite failing the technical insolvency tests.

Chris Laughton is a partner at Mercer & Hole. The views given in this blog are personal to the author.

Business failures leap as credit crunch hits companies

Experian reports a rise in UK corporate insolvency: up 8.5% in Q1 2008 compared to Q1 2007, in line with our last forecast here.

Business sectors identified as suffering include agriculture, banking, food retail and clothing (although some of the sample sizes are small), but 10% of the quarter's failures are in building and construction.

Regionally, the East Midlands is hardest hit with insolvencies up 53.6%.

Creditors' voluntary liquidations increased by 14.1% but compulsory liquidations fell by 2.2%, perhaps reinforcing concerns about confidence as debtors go for CVLs whilst fewer creditors are pursuing compulsory winding-up. The popularity of the procedures amenable to corporate rescue - administrations and company voluntary arrangements - continues with growth of 23.7% and 37.6% respectively.

My own experience is that more businesses are considering an insolvency procedure than either 3 or 12 months ago. Certainly, businesses cannot borrow their way out of trouble at the moment and the signs are that advice about facing insolvency is being sought earlier - offering more prospect of a constructive solution.

Insolvency can be good for you!

A version of this article first appeared in Financier Worldwide Global Restructuring & Insolvency Review 2003

The 21st century has seen the firm establishment of a rescue culture in the UK, exemplified by the growing influence of the Society of Turnaround Professionals and the now familiar corporate insolvency provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002.

The legislative developments have served to lower entry barriers to insolvency proceedings in terms of cost and perception, the latter through reducing the "stigma of bankruptcy". In particular, the statutory objectives of administration, which is firmly established as the jurisdictionís principal non-terminal corporate insolvency procedure, are defined with "rescuing the company as a going concern" as the first priority.

Solutions like those in the case studies below are now easier to implement (if not necessarily to conceive or manage), making it all the more vital to consult an experienced and rescue-oriented insolvency practitioner at an early stage.

In Case Study 1, early realisation that the groupís cost reductions had lagged the industry-wide market collapse was a key factor, enabling the (nevertheless rapid) formulation and execution of a refinancing and balance sheet restructuring plan. Had this company not been caught in time it would have hit the buffers really hard ñ speed of reaction was of the essence.

Case Study 1

Antal International Limited ñ £20m turnover global recruitment business

Problem:


  • Dramatic market contraction 2001


Solution:

  • Bank debt replaced by invoice financing.

  • Invoice financiers would only fund with administrators controlling company.

  • Administration (August 2002) allowed more cost cutting and "breathing space".

  • Subsequent Company Voluntary Arrangement (October 2002) eliminated excess creditors and restored profitability and cash generation.


Other Features:

  • Paramount distinguished (administrator did not automatically adopt employment contracts after 14 days).

  • European Insolvency Regulations tested in action.


Case Study 2 was a relatively healthy core business being turned around successfully. However, the reverse premium that would have been required to effect a trade sale of the two most seriously underperforming subsidiaries would have brought it down. Selling the subsidiary businesses and assets as going concerns through a formal insolvency process was anathema to the incumbent management, but we showed them the value of an insolvency tool in the right hands. Here it both avoided a potentially terminal cash drain and protected the core business from the likely counter-claims of group-wide customers if the subsidiariesí businesses had not continued.

Case Study 2

£10m turnover engineering business
Problem:


  • Restructured 2000

  • Ongoing turnaround

  • 2 subsidiaries draining cash.


Solution:

  • Subsidiariesí administrative receivership (October 2002).

  • Going concern sales of their businesses and assets.

  • Remaining group freed of cost, risk and contingent liabilities.


Other Features:

  • Group pension fund issues required preparation for parent company administration to precipitate commercial settlement on the steps of the Court.


Case Study 3 is the most innovative. The cash-rich quoted shell with a positive balance sheet had contingent liabilities that the Court was persuaded (unlike in Colt Telecom) were more likely than not to render the company unable to pay its debts as they fell due. However, the very use of a formal insolvency procedure prompted the crystallisation of many of those contingencies, yielding significant benefits to shareholders. The administration exit was the return of control to its directors, when the company's shares were relisted at 6 times the price at which they had been suspended.

Case Study 3

PNC Telecom plc ñ £60m turnover AIM-listed former mobile retail and fixed line telephone company.
Problem:


  • Contingencies remaining after sale of operating businesses/subsidiaries precluded use of the shell as a vehicle for a reverse takeover or distribution to shareholders via a membersí voluntary liquidation.


Solution:

  • Administration order (June 2003) prompted landlords to accept replacement obligations from the business purchaser and enabled litigation contingencies to be reduced.


Other Features:

  • s236 Insolvency Act applications allowed the administrator to obtain information about the companyís affairs more quickly and cheaply than could the turnaround managers.


In each of these cases a turnaround manager not well-versed in the benefits of formal insolvency procedures might have continued to "think positive", avoiding insolvency at the risk of missing the opportunity of a successful rescue. I believe that a balanced mix of turnaround and insolvency skills and an ability to innovate are most likely to deliver optimal solutions to the stakeholders of companies in financial distress.

Retail insolvencies start the year

With both Greeting Card Group and Music Zone going into administration this week (reported in Financial Director), are we seeing a retail-led continuation of the last quarter's surge in UK corporate insolvency rates?

It's hardly surprising to see retail administrations at this time of year - over-leveraged and under-performing retailers have minimum borrowings after the Christmas sales peak and secured creditors will naturally choose that point to stop the losses.

Retail has been a risky sector for some while, and although some brands are reporting a strong Christmas season, the continuing consumer debt problem (£1.3 trillion total and over 100,000 personal insolvencies in 2006) cannot help.

But constructive use of formal insolvency - such as the pre-pack administration used to rescue Little Chef this week - can often add value when a business is saleable and the right restructuring team is brought in early enough.

Corporate insolvency rates to grow worldwide

In November 2006 Euler Hermes, the credit insurer, reported:

Economic outlook: global insolvency to increase in 2007

The forecast suggests a peak growth rate of 10% for the USA, as highlighted by Bob Eisenbach at In The (Red), and a global average increase in business insolvency rates of 3%.

The UK forecast is also 3%, but with this week's figures from Experian showing 10.7% UK corporate insolvency growth in 2006, posted here, that 3% forecast may be light.

Rising UK Corporate Insolvency Rate

Experian report a surge in formal insolvencies in the UK in Q4 2006 (see their statistics here: "Corporate failures storm to highest level for more than a decade").

Rates an administration expense?

The Trident Fashions case brought by Exeter City Council on whether business rates have to be paid in priority to an administrator's remuneration returns to the High Court in February, according to Accountancy Age.

Retail insolvencies may be made more difficult if the council wins, which could lead to more out-of-court restructurings or more pre-pack business and asset sales.