Pensions and insolvency risk - the Purple Book revisited

We looked at The Purple Book, the Pensions Regulator's ("TPR") and the Pension Protection Fund's ("PPF") view of pensions and insolvency risk, in an earlier post. Further analysis reveals a strikingly high risk of insolvency for the sponsors of a number of schemes.

Of the defined benefit schemes examined by TPR and the PPF at 31 March 2006, the 82 schemes (1.4%) whose sponsors are most likely to become insolvent within 12 months have an average insolvency probability of 35.7%.

24 of those companies can be expected to have failed already and 5 more are expected to fail in the next two months.

75 of those 82 schemes are underfunded and they represent 41% of the combined insolvency and underfunding risk identified amongst underfunded schemes. They have an average insolvency probability of 37% and combined risk of £226m (£3m per scheme).

The trustees and the management of sponsors of these schemes risk severe criticism or potential personal liability if they do not take insolvency advice from a suitable professional. Many have, but now may not be too late for the rest to act.

Having a significant pension fund deficit is not necessarily terminal to a company whose business is viable, but the earlier all options are explored the more likely it is that a solution will be found.

Insolvency risk - the PPF's "Purple Book"

The Pensions Regulator ("TPR") and the Pension Protection Fund ("PPF") issued The Purple Book in November 2006, revealing, in addition to much wider pension risk issues, the PPF's perspective of insolvency risk, largely on the basis of Dun & Bradstreet's methodology and data.

Key relevant messages include:

  • insolvency risk is higher in companies with poorly funded or small pension schemes or in traditional industries;
  • 0.7% of active companies go into insolvent liquidation each year, but the risk of insolvency is dramatically higher for the 5% of companies with the lowest Dun & Bradstreet failure score (ie those scoring 1 - 5).

Insolvency can be good for you!

The 21st century has seen the firm establishment of a rescue culture in the UK, exemplified by the successful establishment of the Society of Turnaround Professionals and the coming into force of the corporate insolvency provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 in September 2003.

The legislative changes have served to lower entry barriers to insolvency proceedings in terms of cost and perception, the latter through reducing the "stigma of bankruptcy". In particular, the statutory objectives of administration, which has been re-established as the jurisdictionís principal non-terminal insolvency procedure, are now defined with "rescuing the company as a going concern" as the first priority. Solutions like those in the case studies below will now be easier to implement (if not necessarily to conceive or manage), making it all the more vital to consult an experienced and rescue-oriented insolvency practitioner at an early stage. Each case study is factual and I was the administrator and/or the company's advisor.

In Case Study 1, early realisation that the groupís cost reductions had lagged the industry-wide market collapse was a key factor, enabling the (nevertheless rapid) formulation and execution of a refinancing and balance sheet restructuring plan. Had this company not been caught in time it would have hit the buffers really hard ñ speed of reaction was of the essence.

Case Study 2 was a relatively healthy core business being turned around successfully. However, the reverse premium that would have been required to effect a trade sale of the two most seriously underperforming subsidiaries would have brought it down. Selling the subsidiary businesses and assets as going concerns through a formal insolvency process was anathema to the incumbent management, but we showed them the value of an insolvency tool in the right hands. Here it both avoided a potentially terminal cash drain and protected the core business from the likely counter-claims of group-wide customers if the subsidiariesí businesses had not continued.

Case Study 3 is the most innovative. The cash-rich quoted shell with a positive balance sheet had contingent liabilities that the Court was persuaded (unlike in Colt Telecom) were more likely than not to render the company unable to pay its debts as they fell due. However, the very use of a formal insolvency procedure prompted the crystallisation of many of those contingencies such that there was a value to shareholders - the shares were relisted on return of the company to the directors at six time the price at which they were suspended on administration.

In each of these cases a turnaround manager not well-versed in the benefits of formal insolvency procedures might have continued to "think positive", avoiding insolvency at the risk of missing the opportunity of a successful rescue. I believe that a balanced mix of turnaround and insolvency skills and an ability to innovate are most likely to deliver optimal solutions to the stakeholders of companies in financial distress.


  • Case Study 1


Antal International Limited ñ £20m turnover global recruitment business
Problem: Dramatic market contraction
Solution: Bank debt replaced by invoice financing. Invoice financiers would only fund with administrators controlling company. Administration allowed more cost cutting and "breathing space". Subsequent Company Voluntary Arrangement eliminated excess creditors and restored profitability and cash generation.
Other Features: Paramount distinguished (administrator did not automatically adopt employment contracts after 14 days). European Insolvency Regulations tested in action.


  • Case Study 2


£10m turnover engineering business
Problem: Restructured, ongoing turnaround, 2 subsidiaries draining cash.
Solution: Subsidiariesí administrative receivership. Going concern sales of their businesses and assets. Remaining group freed of cost, risk and contingent liabilities.
Other Features: Group pension fund issues required preparation for parent company administration to precipitate commercial settlement on the steps of the Court.


  • Case Study 3


PNC Telecom plc ñ £60m turnover AIM-listed former mobile retail and fixed line telephone company.
Problem: Contingencies remaining after sale of operating businesses/subsidiaries precluded use of the shell as a vehicle for a reverse takeover or distribution to shareholders via a membersí voluntary liquidation.
Solution: Administration order prompted landlords to accept replacement obligations from the business purchaser and enabled litigation contingencies to be reduced. Administration ended after 7 months and company relisted at 6 times the price at which the shares were suspended on the date of administration.
Other Features: s236 Insolvency Act applications allowed the administrator to obtain information about the companyís affairs more quickly and cheaply than could the turnaround managers.

Pension Scheme Failure or Rescue?

Filing s120 (Pensions Act 2004) notices with the Pension Protection Fund is now commonplace for insolvency practitioners. Where there is a defined benefit scheme, most go on to report scheme failure - or occasionally rescue. But what if there is no liability, perhaps because despite the employer's insolvency the scheme was exceedingly well funded (unlikely), or perhaps there was a compromise agreement for which The Pensions Regulator gave clearance?

There is something of a gap in the law, which appears to have been drafted on the assumption that all schemes have net liabilities. The problem is in regulation 9 of The Pension Protection Fund (Entry Rules) Regulation 2005.

In the examples given above where there is no liability, the company has not been rescued as a going concern and no other person has assumed responsibility for the employer liabilities, so on the face of regulation 9(1)(a) the IP has no duty to issue a rescue notice. On the other hand, because no-one has assumed or will assume responsibility for the employer liabilities, regulation 9(2)(a) suggests a duty to issue a failure notice.

Common sense says that to push a scheme with a net surplus into a PPF assessment period by submitting a failure notice must be wrong, given the restrictions that will be applied to scheme members' benefits during the assessment period. And is anyone going to challenge the IP who takes this view?

Probably not, especially as I gather the PPF doesn't see that sort of challenge as its role. But why should the IP be left having to interpret legislation liberally to overcome its deficiencies?