How to invest in the recession

While the recession will undoubtedly hurt a good many people, those (albeit relatively few) private investors and buyers of businesses who have ready cash to invest stand to make handsome profits as they take advantage of increased opportunities to buy 'undervalued' businesses.

For them, choices as to which investment to make, how to make that investment, and timing will be key. Of these three key decisions, the 'how' requires closest professional support, and this article considers some of the issues shrewd investors should consider.

Buying an insolvent business is very different from buying a solvent one

  • Insolvent and unprofitable businesses often have significant hidden costs that can come back, often several years later, to haunt the buyer. The list of such potential costs is long, but typically includes unrecorded customer disputes; underutilised assets to which excessive liabilities are attached; unprofitable products or services where there are significant discontinuation costs; unrecognised tax liabilities, such as on misreported director drawings; and contingent exposure under property leases. The full list goes on and on!
  • Investors are generally unable to call on indemnities for such costs from the owners or management of the business or any insolvency practitioner dealing with the company.
  • Restoring a business to profitability often has significant cost implications. If it didn't, the current owners of the business would probably have already done it.

This means that buyers of, or investors in, insolvent businesses should: 

Assess the level of risk in their investment

It is essential that a thorough due diligence is done, whichever acquisition route is followed - Investors truly have to fully understand the business, not just the potential for greater upsides but also the potential for significant downsides. Investors should not rely on assurances or warranties given by the directors or owners of the business - it is in their interests to say what they think the investor wants to hear in order to get the deal through. In practice directors almost always understate the issues investors may have with the business.
 

Make sure that the risk involved is reflected in the price paid and in the way that the purchase is structured

Investors should always allow themselves some considerable margin for error - in practice nothing works out as well as they would hope when it comes to buying an underperforming business. As the issue of of the structure of the deal is so important, the remainder of this article will focus on some of the key issues we see time and time again.

Structure of the investment

Ask yourself these questions:

1. Should I be buying the shares in the company or the business and assets?

There is nothing to stop investors buying the shares of an insolvent company, the investor will simply have to restore it to solvency by pumping more cash in, typically by increasing the share capital. However the main drawback to any such 'share deal' is that not only does the investor take on the known insolvent position of the business and thus all of its recorded debts, they also take on any unrecorded and unascertained debts. At the time of the deal most investors simply have no real idea what hidden liabilities may or may not lie in the business.

If a business and asset purchase is the route to be taken, the investor takes on only those liabilities that they agree to take on or by law have to take on. It is not unusual for a purchaser to take on debts owed to key suppliers in order to maintain important trading relationships. Other liabilities, such as certain employee liabilities under TUPE, cannot be avoided by law: the investor has to take them on. Such a 'business and asset deal' can give the investor more certainty as to what they are taking on than a share deal - but this is no reason to limit the due diligence exercise, investors should still search out potential liabilities they may be forced to take on at a later date for commercial if not legal reasons.

There can sometimes be advantages to buying the company's shares. For example there is a much easier transition to the new management - all pre-existing contracts, such as with suppliers, customers, finance companies, etc remain in place. Yet again, investors should review all such contracts as part of their due diligence, as some may contain termination provisions, or require pre-existing guarantees to be replaced should there be a change of ownership. Again, it is a case of the investor understanding exactly what they are taking on.

Serial investors often have a model route for buying into businesses. These models do not always fit the specific circumstances of the target business: it is important that both sides recognise that fit is important.

2. Do I really want all of the business?

Often purchasers want to cherry pick, taking the best bits of the business while leaving someone else, either the existing management or an insolvency practitioner, to clear up the parts they do not want.

There are several issues here. Leaving the clearing up of the unwanted remnants of the business can be a diversion of precious management time post acquisition. Management have difficulty valuing the 'best bits' and often wish to distance themselves from the sale process in order to avoid any accusations of having somehow benefited unfairly from the sale - management may prefer the deal to be completed by an insolvency practitioner because he, unlike the directors, has no long term interest in the outcome, and he will, in employing his own valuer to value the business, be able better to explain the rationale for the deal to suppliers and other creditors. Completing a sale through an insolvency practitioner can not only protect the directors from criticism that in some way they failed to comply with their duties, including those under the Insolvency Act 1986 and Companies Act 2006, but can also simplify the overall scheme. And, as you will see later on in this article, it can also save the investor money.

3. Should I defer some or all of the purchase consideration?

Deferring part of the price paid, particularly if the sum is dependent on trading results achieved post acquisition, will reduces investors' risk. As typically vendors look to maximise what they receive in certain cash on day one, the vendor's and purchaser's preferred outcomes can be poles apart.

Another option is to introduce cash into the business on a secured basis, rather than as share capital or unsecured loan. There are several implications of this should the company go into formal insolvency sometime later on: make sure that you discuss your options with the appropriate professionals beforehand.

If the business is insolvent and in need of a cash injection, the investor is often helping the vendor 'avoid' potential exposure to the bank under personal guarantees. Most investors like to see some input from the vendor post acquisition if only in making introductions to customers and suppliers. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable for you to defer some, if not much, of the purchase price as arguably the shares have little or no value at the time when you release your cash and deferring payment will secure the vendor's cooperation.

4. Have I explored the tax consequences?

If an investor buys the shares in the company and it has tax losses, the losses can be used going forward, against profits of the same business. If the assets are bought instead, the benefit of such tax losses are often lost.

Take advice from a tax specialist as this is very much a simplification of a much more complicated situation.

5. What are the true costs of this purchase?

Putting the company into a formal insolvency process and buying the business and assets from an insolvency practitioner can enable potential investors to reduce the working capital requirement of the business and thus the amount of cash they need to invest. In the right circumstances a 'Pre-pack', where the insolvency practitioner completes a sale of the business and assets immediately after his appointment, may be the best way to put the business on a soundest possible footing going forward, but here too there are further issues, with pre-packs coming under ever greater scrutiny.

Stop, think and plan

In summary, shrewd investors considering buying an underperforming or insolvent business, will stop, think, and then re-assess exactly what they intend doing and how before committing. That way they will maximise the profits from, and reduce their risk on, the increasing number of opportunities they will surely get as the Recession bites deeper.

Restructuring your way out of recession

Credit is hard to find and, with global recession looming, businesses face many new challenges. The solution is to develop sensible, cost effective and tax efficient restructuring plans.

Cash flow and business viability are key and should be uppermost in your mind when considering restructuring options and strategy. Falling turnover, pressure on margins and limited cash resources require a tightening of belts and a speedy withdrawal from those business ventures that have a long lead time to profitability, or otherwise drain the business of cash. Identifying such parts of the business is usually quite easy, but downsizing or eliminating them can be extremely challenging.

A good restructuring plan begins with an in-depth review of the business operations and an understanding of what drives costs, profits and cash flow. After analysing the business model and its structure you should consider the restructuring options available, taking into account relevant commercial and legal constraints effecting the business operations and its cash resource.

Restructuring a business is likely to involve the removal of financial burdens that may include the cost of premises, employees, unprofitable contracts, or loss-making subsidiary companies or operations. The legal mechanisms for dealing with these will be different in each case and may involve compromising debt through a company voluntary arrangement or via an administration, or even liquidation. The need for an insolvency process will depend upon whether the company, group or business requires protection from its creditors while a restructuring plan is put in place.

The main focus is to establish a restructuring plan that saves jobs, goodwill and business infrastructure, retaining value to the business wherever commercially and sensibly possible. Business restructuring can be painful, impacting upon the many stakeholders who have supported the business over the years, but this pain should be short-lived. Restructuring an operation into a viable, more streamlined and profitable business will provide opportunities for most of those stakeholders already involved; without restructuring they would get nothing.

None of this can you do alone. You need an adviser with experience and expertise in developing the most appropriate restructuring plan for a business facing either a need to downsize or financial distress. They will analyse and consider restructuring and refinancing options, with or without an insolvency process, introducing funders and investors where necessary.

When we at Mercer & Hole are asked to advise in these circumstances, we analyse with clients the requirements and consequences of a restructuring plan and endeavour to ensure that its implementation is as effective and painless as commercially possible.

What will happen to my employees if my company goes bust?

It depends on:

  • how early you react to deal with the problem;
  • whether any part of the business is able to continue as a going concern; and
  • what workforce is required for that business (remembering that a purchaser may have some positions already covered).

The result can vary:

  • no material change if insolvency can be averted quickly;
  • some redundancies as part of an operational turnaround, again whilst avoiding formal insolvency; or
  • if an insolvency procedure is necessary:
    • some or all of the workforce may be made redundant (leading to enhanced pre-insolvency claims);
    • pre-insolvency claims may receive anything between the modest state-guaranteed limits and full payment; and
    • wages and salaries for employment during insolvency should be paid in full.

This is a highly complex area of insolvency law and practice. Further background reading is available here from Business Link and here from The Insolvency Service.

There is no substitute for consulting a specialist, whose advice will be tailored to your specific circumstances. Most licensed insolvency practitioners, including those at Mercer & Hole, will consider the position with you at an initial meeting without charge.

 

Find a Business Angel

We all know how to find a good service provider - personal recommendation. But what if you want help now and don't know who to ask?

One piece of good advice is to be wary of paying someone up front to find an investor for you - see Corporate Insolvency - Ecademy for an independent consultant's view. Any good professional will discuss your business with you first without charge and look to establish whether a business angel is likely to invest. I certainly would, and I would be delighted to help you find an investor if that's the best thing to do in all the circumstances. Of course, the right solution may be corporate or operational restructuring, or even the use of an insolvency process, and you may be advised to spend money with the professional to implement that optimum solution.

By the way, adding to the Ecademy post, if you want to find an insolvency practitioner (not that you need to look any further if you're reading this),  the most user-friendly search tool is at the website  of R3, the insolvency practitioners' trade body,  here.

Group and Company Reorganisations - s110 arrangements

At some time during the development of a company the directors and shareholders are likely
to see advantages in diversifying the ownership of business activities. There are many
reasons why a reorganisation of a company's activities is desirable. More often than not the
desire is either to protect one or more business activities or to divide business assets so that
shareholders may go off in different directions.

The presence of potential tax liabilities can often be a deterrent. With careful planning, however, the commercial advantages of a reorganisation of business activities or shareholdings can be realised without triggering a significant (or in some cases any) tax bill. 

There are two principal ways of achieving this - through a statutory demerger or by using Section 110, Insolvency Act 1986. Provided the necessary criteria (eg not for the puposes of a sale or cessation of trade, not an investment buiness) are met, a statutory demerger can offer a relatively straightforward means of separating two trades. In our experience the criteria are such that most private business separations are made using the provisions of Section 110.

In this blog I explain how a solvent liquidation and Section 110 allow businesses to achieve their goals in this area.

The commercial justification driving a reorganisation will often be a wish to separate the business assets or activities so as to minimise risk to other parts of the business, or to allow shareholders to take greater ownership of the part of the business they wish to develop. Equally, though, it is possible that the management want to sell part of the business, whilst retaining the remainder. Examples of reorganisations on which we have recently advised include:

  • A typical (pyramid) group with three activities (pubs and restaurants, hotels
    and hotel management) was demerged into three separate groups reflecting
    the separate trades. 
  • Shareholders in a company owning nursing homes wished to separate the
    business assets between them so that they each could further develop part of
    the business, as they wanted. The properties were separated out into new companies. 
  • A commercial property was split from a company's trading activity and transferred to a new company, so increasing the chances of a tax efficient sale of the trading business at a later date.
  • A company carrying on two trades was approached by a potential purchaser who wanted only one of these trades. The trades were separated and the business wanted by the third party was sold.

In all of these cases, the reorganisation involved a Section 110 liquidation. 

Company reorganisations are fraught with tax issues. These include capital gains tax  (CGT), income tax on potential distributions or employment related transfers (benefits in kind), inheritance tax (IHT) - if there is a gift transferring value between shareholders - and stamp duty land tax (SDLT).

The prospect of facing significant tax liabilities will often be a deterrent to a reorganisation, particularly for the smaller business. However, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) recognise the procedure under Section 110 and will give tax clearances (where possible), confirming that the reorganisation is being carried out for genuine commercial reasons and that the various tax reliefs associated with a reorganisation are available. Provided that the reorganisation then follows the route advised to HMRC, the tax liabilities should be kept to a minimum.

Under Section 110 a liquidator may, with sanction, receive shares, policies or like interests in a transferring company for distribution among the members of the transferor company.

A typical Section 110 scheme will involve the creation of a new holding company (Newco H), which will, as part of the reorganisation, be placed into liquidation. This has a number of benefits, including the fact that Oldco is not associated with the liquidation.

Existing shareholders will exchange their shares for the issue of shares in Newco H in proportion to their present shareholding. The assets of Oldco will then be reorganised into the appropriate segments that will make them easily transferrable out of the group. This is likely to involve either
the transfer or distribution of assets or shares up to Newco H prior to liquidation.

Two or more new companies are then formed (Newco A and Newco B, etc). Newco H is placed into solvent liquidation and the liquidator tasked under Section 110 with distributing the assets of Newco H, in exchange for shares to be distributed to the shareholders of Newco H. The shareholdings in Newcos A, B etc need not necessarily be in the same proportion of the shareholdings in Newco H if, for example, the reorganisation is to enable shareholders to take ownership of different parts of the business. However, it will be critical, to avoid a tax charge, that
shareholders inherit shares with a value proportionate to their pre-reorganisation value.

Though comparatively rare, it is possible to carry out a Section 110 scheme or reorganisation without forming Newco H. However, creditors of the company to be liquidated will have to be settled either before or as part of the liquidation process.

There are some complicated tax rules where properties are being transferred and then leave a group, as well as SDLT considerations. Where the reorganisation involves properties, the tax planning and advice will be more involved.

In conclusion, the commercial justification to reorganise the business assets, activities or shareholders' interests within a company should not be frustrated by potential tax liabilities. HMRC recognise what can be achieved by a Section 110 reorganisation. Tax planning is critical, as is the drafting of the legal documentation covering the reorganisation.

Directors' responsibilities in troubled companies

Directors' duties

Directors' duties can be onerous at the best of times. The general duties have been codified in the Companies Act 2006 and are summarised simply in the following Ministerial statement:

  1. Act in the company’s best interests taking everything you think relevant into account.
  2. Obey the company’s constitution and decisions taken under it.
  3. Be honest and remember that the company’s property belongs to it and not to you or its shareholders.
  4. Be diligent, careful and well informed about the company’s affairs. If you have any special skills or experience use them.
  5. Make sure the company keeps records of your decisions.
  6. Remember that you remain responsible for the work you give to others.
  7. Avoid situations where your interests conflict with those of the company. When in doubt disclose potential conflicts quickly.
  8. Seek external advice where necessary, particularly if the company is in financial difficulty.

Troubled companies

But things get more difficult if the company has financial problems.

Directors must recognise that when a company’s assets exceed its liabilities or it cannot pay its debts as they fall due, their primary duty ceases to be to the shareholders and the interests of creditors become paramount.

Failure to carry out his duties with the appropriate degree of skill and care may render a director liable for wrongful trading if he knew or ought to have known that the company could not avoid insolvent liquidation. The guilty director may then be liable to compensate creditors for the losses caused by his conduct. He may also be disqualified from acting as a director for up to 15 years. 

Practical steps

What can you do as a director to protect yourself when your company is in financial difficulties?

  1. Hold regular full board meetings and keep comprehensive minutes of commercial decisions and the reasons for them - indeed, keep notes of all significant discussions about the company's affairs.
  2. Make sure that you have full financial information and are aware of the extent of creditor pressure, court or recovery action by creditors and disputes.
  3. Make sure that the decisions you take are taken in the interests of creditors.
  4. Seek specialist advice. You are not expected to know all the answers about how to deal with financial distress.
  5. If you know or suspect that there is no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding insolvent liquidation, discuss the situation at a full board meeting with a view to taking specialist advice and initiating a formal insolvency procedure.
  6. Take independent advice if fellow directors do not share your concerns about the company’s solvency.
  7. Do not take further credit.
  8. Take steps to minimise losses to all creditors equally.

Points 7 and 8 can be particularly challenging in the real world and will be much easier to deal with if you have the benefit of specialist insolvency advice.

Seek advice early as this not only protects you as a director, it widens the options for rescue and turnaround action.

Northern Rock nationalised

The Chancellor has announced (notably without using the n-word) that Northern Rock is to be nationalised.

What does this mean?
  • The shares pass into public ownership
  • The government has at last called the bluff of the hedge fund shareholders
  • Ron Sandler becomes Executive Chairman
  • Focus should now be brought to restructuring the business to create - in several months' time - something saleable
It will be difficult for the government to avoid the charge of dither and delay. As reported in our previous post, the Treasury Select Committee has made clear that early decisive action was the missing ingredient in this restructuring.

Although the company should now be able to concentrate on turning itself around, the government - as the new owner - should steer clear of micromanagement. Mr Sandler and his team should be left to manage the business, and the government should concentrate on the politics (and the arguments with shareholders about compensation).

At least the risk of formal insolvency has receded almost entirely - it's just not necessary with the Treasury as both senior lender and shareholder. The balance sheet has been restructured through a form of debt-for-equity deal. One could also describe nationalisation in this case as a form of administration or receivership but without the stigma of insolvency and with only shareholders being crammed down. Indeed, had the government not guaranteed all the depositors, Northern Rock would have been in a similar position to other companies with administration being the mechanism used to restructure the balance sheet.

UK Economy - recession or mere turbulence?

Here's a view on the UK's economic outlook from Howard Reed, Chief Economist at the Institute for Public Policy Research, published in the New Statesman: Was Northern Rock the worst of it?

Despite huge stock market falls in the last two days, the balance of comment still appears to be that the underlying UK economy is in reasonable shape and whilst we can expect further tightening a recession is not on the cards.

Reports following analysis of January's Monetary Policy Committee minutes at Bloomberg and Channel 4 News illustrate current thinking (although the latter notes that George Soros, billionaire investor, disagrees. . . ).

No recession, I agree, but we certainly haven't seen the worst of the turbulence. In the business world I think there are many who have not yet come to terms with either the dramatic change in lenders' appetites or the effect the turbulence has had on consumer sentiment.

The boom-bust cycle: where are we now?

The credit crunch of August-September 2007 has disturbed the economic equilibrium - and may continue for a while yet. Debates about illiquidity or insolvency abound, but are we really facing a swing from boom to bust?

The underlying UK economy is strong, but we now have corporate transactions stalling through lack of funding, hedge fund failures, a sub-prime lender in administration and the Northern Rock bailout. What many considered a strange US phenomenon (had many people heard of sub-prime before this summer?) has become a real domestic issue. No wonder business and consumer sentiment is waning:

  • the ICAEW UK Business Confidence Monitor (BCM) has moderated in Q3 2007 from a Q2 peak of +11.5 to a relatively weak +4.8;
  • the BDO Optimism Index shows a sharp fall in August, from 101.9 to 101.2, confirming the impact of the US sub-prime crisis on UK businesses. This drop takes the Index to its lowest score since November 2005 and whilst business optimism has been decreasing slowly since July 2006, it appears that the impact of the turbulent financial markets has accelerated this trend; and
  • the Nationwide Consumer Confidence Index fell back in August reflecting the impact of five interest rate rises over the past year. The main Index fell by two points, but it was not alone. All indices fell in August, the first time since December 2006 that all four measures of confidence showed a downturn in the same month.

For a reminder of how the credit crunch derived from the US sub-prime contagion via risk reappraisal amongst lenders and hedge funds, how CDOs, CLOs and SIV-lites were ideal vectors to spread the disease around the world, and the impact on bank lending, read "While you were away - fear and loathing in the markets" from The Times.

Other recent indications of the state and direction of the economy are:

  • US business bankruptcies are on the rise, reports Bob Eisenbach, quoting Euler Hermes, who continued to forecast a small rise in the UK. After we reported Euler's November '06 forecast in a previous post, Geoff Swire commented when the UK's June insolvency figures became available that the forecast had been pessimistic. I suspect it was a timing issue and that corporate insolvency statistics in Q3 will rise in the UK, albeit by less than in the US.
  • The world has changed dramatically: Germany’s Chamber of Industry has been flooded with distress calls from family Mittlestand firms unable to roll over credit lines and in Canada and Australia, junior mining finance has dried up almost entirely, according to Ambrose Evans-Pritchard on his Telegraph blog post "Brace yourself for the insolvency crunch".
  • If the liquidity crisis continues it will will become an insolvency crisis and the banking industry will be hardest hit, according to Panmure Gordon.
  • Insolvency firms are likely to be busy dismantling failed investment vehicles, with the most likely suspects being the quantitative hedge funds and funds focused on CDOs that have fallen foul of market conditions, writes Antonia Rawlinson "Uncertain times call for certain measures" in The Lawyer.
  • "The M&A boom is over and law firms must adapt" agrees James Rossiter in The Times - restructuring is now the hottest game in town.

So what does all this mean? Yes the capital markets are in turmoil, banks are lending much more cautiously and some high risk investment vehicles are failing, but essentially this is only a liquidity problem. Its effect though is that stressed businesses will no longer be able to borrow their way out of trouble as they have become hard-wired to do over the last 3 years.

Crisis cash management and operational and corporate restructuring will come back into vogue as refinancing becomes passé. Only if stressed businesses fail to seek appropriate and timely assistance will the business insolvency statistics really start to rise.

Phoenix Companies - re-using the name of an insolvent company

Question: I am the director of an insolvent company and want to use a similar name in my new business. Can it be done and what are the pitfalls?

Answer: Yes it can be done. The main pitfalls are the penalties if you get the details wrong - imprisonment or a fine, or both, and personal liability for the debts of your new company!

 

Q: So how can I use the name I want without risk?

A: Either:

  1. you buy the business from the insolvency practitioner appointed to the insolvent company and send certain information to its creditors;
  2. you apply to court for permission to use the new name; or
  3. the new company has been known by the new name for 12 months before the old company went into formal insolvency.

 

Q: So as long as I give notice or get permission there will be no problem?

A: As you might expect, the law is not entirely straightforward:

  • the points above apply from 6 August 2007 (until then problems with the wording of the law and a Court of Appeal decision made it much more difficult - our technical posts explain this here);
  • there are strict time limits for giving notice and making court applications; and
  • making a court application costs money and the court may say no!

 

Q: So what should I do?

A: This is a tricky and specialised area where you should take advice from an independent insolvency practitioner or a specialist insolvency lawyer.

Powerhouse CVA dispute victory

Yesterday's judgement in the Powerhouse company voluntary arrangement (CVA) dispute has been hailed as a victory for landlords, but in reality will lead to landlords seeking greater security from tenants.

Reported in The Times and Citywire, the High Court decision (Etherton J) in fact held that parent company guarantees can effectively be avoided through a CVA, provided the value of the guarantee is recognised in the proposal. In other words, guaranteed creditors must get a better deal than ordinary unsecured creditors.

Whilst the landlords' advisers, Addleshaw Goddard and Lovells, are keen to emphasise the judge's ruling against "guarantee stripping", a well-crafted and balanced CVA remains a powerful tool for managing minority creditors' claims.

Who do you think actually got the better deal here, the landlords or the beleaguered insolvency practitioners trying to find an equitable solution for all stakeholders? Will the commercial property market suffer, or is this another attack (like the Trident case on administrators' liability for business rates) on the proper and efficient use of insolvency procedures as rescue tools? Let us have your comments.

Schefenacker refinancing agreed

Schefenacker reports that its bondholders have agreed today, at a company voluntary arrangement meeting, to take:

  • EUR 7.5 million cash;
  • 5% of the equity; and
  • warrants that could raise the equity to 15%.

The shareholder, Dr Alfred Schefenacker, retains 25% of the equity but has contributed:

  • EUR 20 million of new money;
  • his personal equity in the Engelmann subsidiary; and
  • the cancellation of EUR 100 million of shareholder loans.

Senior creditors now hold 70% of the equity.

The success of the migration now depends on the operational restructuring that Stephen Taylor has been managing during the last few months of stakeholder negotiations - he claims "a solid first quarter performance".

Schefenacker revises restructuring deal

Schefenacker PLC's creditors' meeting, which was due to have been held on Friday 30 March to cram down €200million of bondholder claims to a 5% equity stake through a Company Voluntary Arrangement, has been adjourned to 4 May, according to the company and as reported by Plastics Industry News. Modifications offering bondholders 15% of the equity and a total of €7.5m in cash will be put to the vote when the meeting reconvenes.

Speculation (see earlier post) that the original proposals, published on 9 February, did not offer enough for bondholders proved correct.

Full details of the modifications - particularly how far Dr Schefenacker, the original shareholder, will be diluted if the bondholders receive 15% - have yet to emerge, but it is clear that bondholders were prepared to risk losing everything in a liquidation rather than settle for 5%.

After a very difficult 6 months, is there light at the end of the Schefenacker tunnel? And is migration becoming a successful and accepted mechanism for restructuring distressed German companies?

European Restructuring: Migration or Forum Shopping

Debtors migrate but creditors forum shop.

Robert Hickmott and Alex Ballman write in Legal Week about how the trio of German cases:


  • Deutsche Nickel

  • Hans Brochier

  • Schefenacker


illustrate the post-Eurofood attitude to COMI (centre of main interests) under the European Insolvency Regulation.

It has been established through cases like Staubitz-Schreiber that debtors can move their COMI, and this facility was used in the Collins & Aikman restructuring and insolvencies.

But forum shopping, where creditors race to their court of choice, is what the European Insolvency Regulation sought to avoid.

With COMI now established as elsewhere than the place of a company's registered office only as a result of factors that are both objective and ascertainable by third parties, such cynical or opportunistic forum shopping by creditors is rightly deprecated.

There are many reasons why a debtor might choose to make use of an alternative insolvency regime by moving its COMI, such as:


  • to give UK and US stakeholders comfort that a flexible and familiar (UK) restructuring environment will be available;

  • to make use of Insolvenzgeld funding (Germany & Austria);

  • to avoid Acquired Rights Directive/TUPE problems with employees (Netherlands);

  • to enhance employee protection (France); or

  • to use DIP financing (Sweden).


But it will be critical, as the Hans Brochier directors discovered, to get the details of the COMI move right.

The Deutsche Nickel mechanism - conversion to a limited partnership and transfer of the assets and liabilities to the new general partner (in that case an English company) by universal succession - is a specific form of migration that nevertheless requires a COMI to be established in another jurisdiction.

Migration is the acceptable face of forum shopping, and we will see more of it!

Schefenacker migration and restructuring

Bondholders may not find 5% of the equity an appealing prospect, but the level of pain to be borne by Schefenacker's existing shareholders is yet to emerge.

The company has announced replacement of €250m 1st and 2nd lien debt and €200m of subordinated bonds with new debt of €305m:

  • €25m senior revolving credit
  • €170m senior term loan
  • €110m mezzanine

Some of the €55m "new money" is said to come from a mezzanine investment from the group's owner, Dr Alfred Schefenacker, who is also transferring minority interests in Schefenacker Engelmann Spiegel GmbH to the group. His shareholding in the group is to be reallocated in part to the senior lenders.

The value of his financial contributions and the extent of his the equity dilution may be enough to make the deal work. The company says it doesn't need bondholder approval, but neither has it yet announced the detail of the restructuring mechanism. . . .

Schefenacker €200 million debt write-off

Insolvency can be good for you!

A version of this article first appeared in Financier Worldwide Global Restructuring & Insolvency Review 2003

The 21st century has seen the firm establishment of a rescue culture in the UK, exemplified by the growing influence of the Society of Turnaround Professionals and the now familiar corporate insolvency provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002.

The legislative developments have served to lower entry barriers to insolvency proceedings in terms of cost and perception, the latter through reducing the "stigma of bankruptcy". In particular, the statutory objectives of administration, which is firmly established as the jurisdictionís principal non-terminal corporate insolvency procedure, are defined with "rescuing the company as a going concern" as the first priority.

Solutions like those in the case studies below are now easier to implement (if not necessarily to conceive or manage), making it all the more vital to consult an experienced and rescue-oriented insolvency practitioner at an early stage.

In Case Study 1, early realisation that the groupís cost reductions had lagged the industry-wide market collapse was a key factor, enabling the (nevertheless rapid) formulation and execution of a refinancing and balance sheet restructuring plan. Had this company not been caught in time it would have hit the buffers really hard ñ speed of reaction was of the essence.

Case Study 1

Antal International Limited ñ £20m turnover global recruitment business

Problem:


  • Dramatic market contraction 2001


Solution:

  • Bank debt replaced by invoice financing.

  • Invoice financiers would only fund with administrators controlling company.

  • Administration (August 2002) allowed more cost cutting and "breathing space".

  • Subsequent Company Voluntary Arrangement (October 2002) eliminated excess creditors and restored profitability and cash generation.


Other Features:

  • Paramount distinguished (administrator did not automatically adopt employment contracts after 14 days).

  • European Insolvency Regulations tested in action.


Case Study 2 was a relatively healthy core business being turned around successfully. However, the reverse premium that would have been required to effect a trade sale of the two most seriously underperforming subsidiaries would have brought it down. Selling the subsidiary businesses and assets as going concerns through a formal insolvency process was anathema to the incumbent management, but we showed them the value of an insolvency tool in the right hands. Here it both avoided a potentially terminal cash drain and protected the core business from the likely counter-claims of group-wide customers if the subsidiariesí businesses had not continued.

Case Study 2

£10m turnover engineering business
Problem:


  • Restructured 2000

  • Ongoing turnaround

  • 2 subsidiaries draining cash.


Solution:

  • Subsidiariesí administrative receivership (October 2002).

  • Going concern sales of their businesses and assets.

  • Remaining group freed of cost, risk and contingent liabilities.


Other Features:

  • Group pension fund issues required preparation for parent company administration to precipitate commercial settlement on the steps of the Court.


Case Study 3 is the most innovative. The cash-rich quoted shell with a positive balance sheet had contingent liabilities that the Court was persuaded (unlike in Colt Telecom) were more likely than not to render the company unable to pay its debts as they fell due. However, the very use of a formal insolvency procedure prompted the crystallisation of many of those contingencies, yielding significant benefits to shareholders. The administration exit was the return of control to its directors, when the company's shares were relisted at 6 times the price at which they had been suspended.

Case Study 3

PNC Telecom plc ñ £60m turnover AIM-listed former mobile retail and fixed line telephone company.
Problem:


  • Contingencies remaining after sale of operating businesses/subsidiaries precluded use of the shell as a vehicle for a reverse takeover or distribution to shareholders via a membersí voluntary liquidation.


Solution:

  • Administration order (June 2003) prompted landlords to accept replacement obligations from the business purchaser and enabled litigation contingencies to be reduced.


Other Features:

  • s236 Insolvency Act applications allowed the administrator to obtain information about the companyís affairs more quickly and cheaply than could the turnaround managers.


In each of these cases a turnaround manager not well-versed in the benefits of formal insolvency procedures might have continued to "think positive", avoiding insolvency at the risk of missing the opportunity of a successful rescue. I believe that a balanced mix of turnaround and insolvency skills and an ability to innovate are most likely to deliver optimal solutions to the stakeholders of companies in financial distress.

Pensions and insolvency risk - the Purple Book revisited

We looked at The Purple Book, the Pensions Regulator's ("TPR") and the Pension Protection Fund's ("PPF") view of pensions and insolvency risk, in an earlier post. Further analysis reveals a strikingly high risk of insolvency for the sponsors of a number of schemes.

Of the defined benefit schemes examined by TPR and the PPF at 31 March 2006, the 82 schemes (1.4%) whose sponsors are most likely to become insolvent within 12 months have an average insolvency probability of 35.7%.

24 of those companies can be expected to have failed already and 5 more are expected to fail in the next two months.

75 of those 82 schemes are underfunded and they represent 41% of the combined insolvency and underfunding risk identified amongst underfunded schemes. They have an average insolvency probability of 37% and combined risk of £226m (£3m per scheme).

The trustees and the management of sponsors of these schemes risk severe criticism or potential personal liability if they do not take insolvency advice from a suitable professional. Many have, but now may not be too late for the rest to act.

Having a significant pension fund deficit is not necessarily terminal to a company whose business is viable, but the earlier all options are explored the more likely it is that a solution will be found.

Insolvency can be good for you!

The 21st century has seen the firm establishment of a rescue culture in the UK, exemplified by the successful establishment of the Society of Turnaround Professionals and the coming into force of the corporate insolvency provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 in September 2003.

The legislative changes have served to lower entry barriers to insolvency proceedings in terms of cost and perception, the latter through reducing the "stigma of bankruptcy". In particular, the statutory objectives of administration, which has been re-established as the jurisdictionís principal non-terminal insolvency procedure, are now defined with "rescuing the company as a going concern" as the first priority. Solutions like those in the case studies below will now be easier to implement (if not necessarily to conceive or manage), making it all the more vital to consult an experienced and rescue-oriented insolvency practitioner at an early stage. Each case study is factual and I was the administrator and/or the company's advisor.

In Case Study 1, early realisation that the groupís cost reductions had lagged the industry-wide market collapse was a key factor, enabling the (nevertheless rapid) formulation and execution of a refinancing and balance sheet restructuring plan. Had this company not been caught in time it would have hit the buffers really hard ñ speed of reaction was of the essence.

Case Study 2 was a relatively healthy core business being turned around successfully. However, the reverse premium that would have been required to effect a trade sale of the two most seriously underperforming subsidiaries would have brought it down. Selling the subsidiary businesses and assets as going concerns through a formal insolvency process was anathema to the incumbent management, but we showed them the value of an insolvency tool in the right hands. Here it both avoided a potentially terminal cash drain and protected the core business from the likely counter-claims of group-wide customers if the subsidiariesí businesses had not continued.

Case Study 3 is the most innovative. The cash-rich quoted shell with a positive balance sheet had contingent liabilities that the Court was persuaded (unlike in Colt Telecom) were more likely than not to render the company unable to pay its debts as they fell due. However, the very use of a formal insolvency procedure prompted the crystallisation of many of those contingencies such that there was a value to shareholders - the shares were relisted on return of the company to the directors at six time the price at which they were suspended on administration.

In each of these cases a turnaround manager not well-versed in the benefits of formal insolvency procedures might have continued to "think positive", avoiding insolvency at the risk of missing the opportunity of a successful rescue. I believe that a balanced mix of turnaround and insolvency skills and an ability to innovate are most likely to deliver optimal solutions to the stakeholders of companies in financial distress.


  • Case Study 1


Antal International Limited ñ £20m turnover global recruitment business
Problem: Dramatic market contraction
Solution: Bank debt replaced by invoice financing. Invoice financiers would only fund with administrators controlling company. Administration allowed more cost cutting and "breathing space". Subsequent Company Voluntary Arrangement eliminated excess creditors and restored profitability and cash generation.
Other Features: Paramount distinguished (administrator did not automatically adopt employment contracts after 14 days). European Insolvency Regulations tested in action.


  • Case Study 2


£10m turnover engineering business
Problem: Restructured, ongoing turnaround, 2 subsidiaries draining cash.
Solution: Subsidiariesí administrative receivership. Going concern sales of their businesses and assets. Remaining group freed of cost, risk and contingent liabilities.
Other Features: Group pension fund issues required preparation for parent company administration to precipitate commercial settlement on the steps of the Court.


  • Case Study 3


PNC Telecom plc ñ £60m turnover AIM-listed former mobile retail and fixed line telephone company.
Problem: Contingencies remaining after sale of operating businesses/subsidiaries precluded use of the shell as a vehicle for a reverse takeover or distribution to shareholders via a membersí voluntary liquidation.
Solution: Administration order prompted landlords to accept replacement obligations from the business purchaser and enabled litigation contingencies to be reduced. Administration ended after 7 months and company relisted at 6 times the price at which the shares were suspended on the date of administration.
Other Features: s236 Insolvency Act applications allowed the administrator to obtain information about the companyís affairs more quickly and cheaply than could the turnaround managers.

Rates an administration expense?

The Trident Fashions case brought by Exeter City Council on whether business rates have to be paid in priority to an administrator's remuneration returns to the High Court in February, according to Accountancy Age.

Retail insolvencies may be made more difficult if the council wins, which could lead to more out-of-court restructurings or more pre-pack business and asset sales.

Schefenacker Restructuring

Schefenacker AG, the €930m turnover automotive parts group manufacturing rear-view mirrors with 7,900 employees in 33 locations worldwide, which was founded in Esslingen (near Stuttgart), Germany in 1935, has become Schefenacker PLC with a registered office in Portsmouth, UK. (Were some reports of the company moving to Brighton a mis-translation of Britain?)

In a move redolent of the Deutsche Nickel restructuring in 2004/05, the owner of this typical Mittelstand family business, Dr Alfred Schefenacker, is likely to be diluted to below 4%, with the majority of the equity passing to bondholders in a debt for equity swap. German debt for equity deals are rare and don't often go below 10% equity retention, but greater dilution is the norm in the UK.

Binding all creditors with a 75% majority vote is posible in the UK through a Company Voluntary Arrangement or a s425 Companies Act 1985 Sceme of Arrangement, whereas in Germany a small minority could hold out. This stage of the deal has not yet been reached, but is expected to be thrashed out between the 90% of creditors said to be based in London.

Further incentives for the choice of mechanism include the German "21-day rule" where German management face criminal sanctions if they fail to file for insolvency within 21 days of the company being unable to pay its debts as they fall due. The more flexible UK test - a reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation - and the absence of criminality facilitates consensual restructurings like this one.

Another factor is the bondholders' perception that they have more control or influence in the UK system, which is less dependent on court involvement than Germany.

The group's recent history involved the acquisition of Britax Vision Systems in 2000, which resulted in too heavy a debt burden. Refinancing in 2005 put some €400m in hedge funds' hands. Q3 2006 figures were below target and on 19 October 2006 the company announced the appointment of Dr Burghard Knolle of AT Kearney as CRO/COO. At that time Hedgeco.net reported bonds trading at 30% and loans at 85%.

On 12 December 2006 the company announced the appointment of Stephen J. Taylor of Alix Partners as CRO

Reuters reports an estimated enterprise value of €200m, based on a conservative distressed multiple of four times a projected EBITDA of €50m (down from €78m in 2005). €50m of senior debt and €155m of second-lien debt is expected to be paid back.

Who else is involved? (sources: Legal Week, Global Turnaround)
Company advisers:


  • Freitag & Co

  • Allen & Overy - David Frauman, Mark Sterling


Senior Lenders (GE):

  • Freshfields - Ken Baird, Lars Westpfahl

  • Deloitte


Deutsche Bank (senior & second lien):

  • Latham & Watkins - John Houghton, Frank Grell


Second Lien Holders:

  • Houlihan Lokey - Peter Marshall, Joe Swanson

  • Cadwalader - Andrew Wilkinson, James Douglas


Bondholders:

  • Bingham McCutchen - James Roome

  • Close Bros - Matthew Prest


OEMs:

  • Clifford Chance - Mark Hyde, Kolja von Bismarck